BGD will contribute 250 ETH to the relief fund coordinated by @aave Labs in relation to the KelpDAO/LZ exploit. BGD is not on Aave anymore, but we support the protocol we contributed to, and the efforts of @aave Labs related to a non-Aave native issue

Day 1

Chainlink SVR is a novel oracle solution, built with @bgdlabs, that enables DeFi apps to recapture non-toxic liquidation MEV. SVR is supported by 96+ independent searchers and is underpinned by the same Chainlink infra that has secured @aave for 6+ years. blog.chain.link/chainlink-sm…

DeFi, simplified. Introducing two new vaults: EarnETH & EarnUSD One vault for ETH-based capital. One for stablecoins. Now live on stake.lido.fi/earn ↓

Proposal for expanding Aave <> Chainlink (@chainlink) SVR to Aave v3 Base and Arbitrum 👻⛓️ governance.aave.com/t/arfc-a…

BGD will be leaving Aave governance.aave.com/t/bgd-le…

Introducing Aave v3.7 governance.aave.com/t/arfc-b…

An important update regarding Project E governance.aave.com/t/bgd-ab…

After a positive signal from the Aave community for a potential expansion of the protocol to megaETH (@megaeth), we have published a technical analysis of the suitability of the network for Aave governance.aave.com/t/bgd-aa…

Umbrella is @aave’s on-chain backstop for realized reserve deficits and a key part of the protocol’s risk framework 🧬 In our latest LlamaRisk Insights, we break down what Umbrella covers, slashing triggers, and why the DAO-funded Deficit Offset is the true first-loss layer. 👇 Umbrella is designed to mitigate realized, on-chain reserve deficits that are explicitly reflected in Aave’s accounting. It provides liquidity only after losses are realized and the reserve deficit exceeds the Deficit Offset, and doesn’t include unrealized deficits, such as temporary market deviations or off-chain insolvencies that are not reflected in Aave’s price oracles. Currently, Umbrella is deployed only on Aave V3 Core and covers reserve-side debt, not collateral positions. Coverage is reserve-specific and non-fungible, meaning liquidity allocated to one reserve cannot be used to cover another. Covered reserves currently include WETH, USDC, USDT, and GHO, with additional assets (USDe, WBTC) expected following the Umbrella Expansion Proposal. Importantly, coverage is limited to actual staked liquidity, not DAO-defined target levels. How & When does Umbrella activate? Umbrella only triggers after a realized reserve deficit is recorded on-chain. If the deficit exceeds the existing Deficit Offset, Umbrella reduces the staked liquidity for the affected reserve by a proportional amount, burning the corresponding aTokens to offset the shortfall. This process is entirely post-event and reactive. Deficit Offset: the first-loss layer A key point often misunderstood: Umbrella stakers are not the first-loss protection layer. The Deficit Offset is a DAO-funded buffer intended to absorb losses before Umbrella liquidity is used. The DAO (or Finance Committee under mandate) is expected to periodically cover this buffer using protocol revenues such as protocol fees, SVR, and liquidation proceeds. Only the portion of a realized deficit that exceeds the Deficit Offset is passed on to Umbrella.

After a positive signal from the Aave community for a potential expansion of the protocol to X Layer (@XLayerOfficial), we have published a technical analysis of the suitability of the network for Aave governance.aave.com/t/bgd-aa…

With the @ethereum Fusaka upgrade approaching, we have published a report on any potential effects on the Aave protocol. To summarise, NO negative impact is expected to be caused by the upgrade on Aave. governance.aave.com/t/bgd-te…

It is now fully confirmed that the AAVE/wstETH Balancer v2 pool is NOT vulnerable, given that its implementation (Weighted pool) is different than the affected Composable Stable pools. Additionally, Balancer v3 pools are NOT affected, including boosted using Aave aTokens as underlyings.

Following the unfortunate exploit of Balancer v2, our preliminary information indicates that the AAVE/wstETH Balancer v2 pool is NOT affected. Again, this is preliminary information; we will keep informing

1/ Introducing @Aave’s Slope2 Risk Oracle. Securing over $20B in Aave liquidity, this adaptive risk system enables a more dynamic and responsive interest-rate model. Powered by Chaos Risk Oracles.

At 3:12 PM EST, Paxos mistakenly minted excess PYUSD as part of an internal transfer. Paxos immediately identified the error and burned the excess PYUSD. This was an internal technical error. There is no security breach. Customer funds are safe. We have addressed the root cause.