Signal rolled out "Automatic Key Verification," which sounds like gibberish to cryptographers.
Turns out, it's key transparency.
So what's key transparency? It's a phone book that makes sure you can't secretly be tricked into talking to the wrong person.
When Bob talks to Jenny, he needs to know her public key. If he gets the wrong one it's like calling the wrong number. Even if everything is secure, he's talking to the wrong person. The problem is, if the app on Bob's phone just asks for Jenny's key, Signal's servers could lie. Far more problematically, they could be forced to lie by an outside attacker, or hacked.
The UK, in particular, seem positively chuffed to try and break encrypted chats this way. Instead of calling Jenny, you'll get some blokes in Cheltenham. Of course, the Brits miss that hackers in Russia or Iran might do the same to calls to Downing Street.
Key transparency builds a shared phone book mapping users' names/phone numbers to their public keys. The logic being someone, like say Jenny, will notice if her key is wrong, so we just need to make sure everyone has the same consistent phone book. That book is too big for everyone to have a copy, so Signal keeps it on their server, but then builds a clever way for everyone to make sure they are getting answers from the same unaltered phone book (technically it's a log, not a book). This is done with a Merkle tree and auditors (in Signal's case, currently Cloudflare and Trail of Bits).