IMPORTANT POST Our industry became too focused on protecting downside risk and inadequately focused on maximizing Total Returns to the upside. In my view, the entire purpose of our structured finance business model must be to maximize Total Returns for common equity shareholders. Our industry needs more amplification. Even at Strive, where we have the highest Amplification Ratio among Digital Credit issuers, when I look at the risk embedded in our capital structure relative to our amplification, I believe we have room to take it up another notch or two. Building a rocket ship is extraordinarily difficult and requires underwriting and taking real risk. The mission requires not blowing up, but you need an engine powerful enough to reach the moon. Based on Amplification Ratio alone, I view the risk of true issuer failure from over-amplification as very low across our industry today. Amplification Ratio obviously cannot capture every risk, including debt terms, covenants, maturity walls, liquidity constraints, and other structural risks. But controlling for those risks should give issuers significant confidence to take amplification materially higher. That is exactly what we have done at Strive, and I hope others increasingly copy it. I’ve written extensively about why Amplification Ratio will be the single most important driver of outright and relative Total Returns in a Bitcoin bull market. However, I believe incentives naturally push toward under-amplification, modest Bitcoin outperformance, and the safest possible path. My goal with this post is to light a fire and push our industry to think bigger, focus more aggressively on growth and Total Returns, and push the frontier of what our business models can achieve. We have a shared mission across the industry to grow Digital Credit from a nascent asset class into a massive global capital market. That requires trusted issuers, deep liquidity, disciplined execution, and investor confidence. That is where we all should work together, but make no mistake about what will crown the fastest horse in a Bitcoin bull market: the engine. Our mandate at Strive is to build the thing we actually want to own and recruit and retain exceptionally talented people who desire that risk and return opportunity and understand the business model that needs to be built. That mindset drove our execution in building a high Amplification Ratio, helped create strong liquidity, and is also why we are not satisfied with where we are. With Bitcoin under $100,000, our desire is to take Amplification Ratio higher from here. If the Bitcoin bull thesis is right, amplification will be the most important thing. If the Bitcoin thesis is wrong, a few hundred basis points of cost of capital won’t be the difference between success and failure. The model itself will have failed. I love capitalism. I love competition. I want more competition for the fastest horse. The next 10–15 years will be the Digital Gold Rush for Bitcoin. Let’s act like it.

From March ‘23 to the top, $MSTR did a 20X in Total Return while Bitcoin was a 5X. A 5X for $BTC from current levels would put it at $424K, which is just below our 50% CAGR base case through 2030. History doesn’t repeat, but it often rhymes & you likely aren’t bullish enough.

Strive security complex traded $1.25 Billion in volume last week. $944M on $ASST $310M on $SATA Back in March of 2023, $MSTR traded $1.25 Billion in volume in a single week. Their market cap was $3.1 Billion, BTC was at $25k Strive’s market cap is $2.9 Billion BTC at $84k

In a Bitcoin bull market, the engine driving Total Returns is Amplification Ratio. Fastest horse requirements: 1. High current Amplification Ratio 2. Ability to replenish Amplification Ratio as BTC rises (liquidity) 3. Zero BTC upside sold for Amplification That's the game.

This matrix explains one of the most important concepts in Bitcoin treasury strategy: amplification ratio is what drives total returns. Over 99% of the variation in modeled total returns shown here is driven by amplification ratio. Cost of capital matters far less than investors realize. Strive’s objective is to outperform Bitcoin by maximizing total returns for common shareholders. Our base case is that Bitcoin compounds at roughly 50% annually through 2030, but the principle applies more broadly. If any Bitcoin bull thesis plays out, building and sustaining a high amplification ratio will be the most important determinant of success. That is why we spent the bear market intentionally building liquidity, earning investor trust in SATA and Strive, deepening our access to capital, and building the foundation required to support a high amplification ratio at scale. Maintaining amplification as Bitcoin compounds will require increasingly large amounts of capital and sustained investor trust, and will be extraordinarily difficult to achieve. If possible, I would like to bring Strive’s amplification ratio above 60% later this year. If our warrants exercise over the next few weeks, getting there will require elite execution from our team. It becomes even more difficult if Bitcoin rallies further. I believe our team can achieve that goal, and that Strive is uniquely positioned to sustain a high amplification ratio at scale. The math tells you what matters, and our strategy follows the math. If I were analyzing Strive as a Bitcoin bull seeking to amplify Bitcoin returns, these are the questions I would be asking: What is Strive’s current amplification ratio? What are our goals for amplification? And to achieve those goals, do we have the capital access, liquidity and investor trust required to maintain a high amplification ratio throughout a bull market? There is real alpha in understanding the answers to those questions. Study the matrix carefully.

The rumors are true: uafly.co/statusmatch

NEW FINDINGS: We took a close look at MSCI’s effort to exclude Bitcoin treasury companies from major stock indexes. We found an internal project trail buried in a public document, years of ESG advocacy, and proposed rules that could reach far beyond Bitcoin. Our new paper, “Wall Street’s Invisible Committee,” documents what we uncovered and provides recommendations for policymakers. MSCI reports an astonishing $21 trillion benchmarked to its indexes. When its committees change which companies qualify, funds tracking those indexes must adjust their holdings. A methodology decision can trigger billions in reallocation. Here’s what we found. 𝟭. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗻𝗲𝘄 𝗽𝗿𝗼𝗽𝗼𝘀𝗮𝗹 𝘀𝘁𝗶𝗹𝗹 𝗰𝗮𝗿𝗿𝗶𝗲𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗼𝗿𝗶𝗴𝗶𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝗽𝗿𝗼𝗷𝗲𝗰𝘁’𝘀 𝗶𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝗻𝗮𝗺𝗲. In 2025, MSCI proposed excluding Digital Asset Treasury Companies (DATCOs) holding at least half their assets in digital assets. After substantial opposition, it shelved the proposal. It later returned this year with a broader, facially neutral test for “non-operating companies.” MSCI’s own simulation would exclude Strategy and Metaplanet. We examined the public consultation PDF and found something revealing in its embedded metadata. The source presentation’s internal file path includes— “Projects/DATCOs/Operating vs Non Operating” A proposal presented as a general classification rule retains a source-file path explicitly associated with the category targeted by the earlier exclusion effort. While metadata alone cannot prove the outcome was predetermined, it raises a direct question for MSCI. Were these criteria developed to classify companies consistently, or engineered to reach the same exclusions against digital asset companies through a broader rule? 𝟮. 𝗠𝗦𝗖𝗜 𝘄𝗮𝘀 𝘀𝗼𝘂𝗻𝗱𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗮𝗹𝗮𝗿𝗺 𝗮𝗯𝗼𝘂𝘁 “𝗰𝗿𝗲𝗲𝗽𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗰𝗿𝘆𝗽𝘁𝗼” 𝘆𝗲𝗮𝗿𝘀 𝗲𝗮𝗿𝗹𝗶𝗲𝗿. We traced its public record back to an October 2021 article titled “Creeping Crypto.” MSCI publicly warned about cryptocurrency exposure entering equity portfolios, described most cryptocurrencies as “speculative investments with little evident utility,” and flagged Bitcoin’s Proof of Work as environmentally dangerous. They identified 26 exposed public companies and promoted tools for screening additional exposure. Singled out at the very bottom of their ESG rankings... was Strategy. While the article did not call for exclusions, it does establish that an internal belief at MSCI that Bitcoin and digital asset companies were an ESG concern four years before proposing to remove digital asset treasury companies. 𝟯. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗰𝗹𝗶𝗺𝗮𝘁𝗲 𝗮𝗴𝗲𝗻𝗱𝗮 𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗰𝗵𝗲𝗱 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗽𝗲𝗼𝗽𝗹𝗲 𝗿𝘂𝗻𝗻𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗯𝘂𝘀𝗶𝗻𝗲𝘀𝘀. CEO Henry Fernandez has repeatedly, publicly proclaimed the urgent importance of ESG investing. In 2021, he recounted urging bankers to “refuse to take a company public or do a bond offering” without a net-zero pledge. MSCI’s leadership also combined responsibility for ESG and index governance. Its then-head of indexes described an ambition for its flagship global index to become “green, one company at a time.” These statements do not prove the motive behind today’s proposal. They make the boundary between MSCI’s advocacy and its broad-market index decisions a serious governance question. 𝟰. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗱𝗶𝘀𝗰𝗿𝗲𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗰𝗼𝘂𝗹𝗱 𝗮𝗳𝗳𝗲𝗰𝘁 𝗔𝗺𝗲𝗿𝗶𝗰𝗮’𝘀 𝗻𝗲𝘅𝘁 𝗴𝗲𝗻𝗲𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗼𝗳 𝗶𝗻𝗱𝘂𝘀𝘁𝗿𝘆. The proposed test relies on “operating assets” without a sufficiently clear, reproducible classification framework. How should it treat a satellite awaiting launch? A mine under construction? Capital raised to build a factory? Our analysis shows how plausible interpretations could disadvantage emerging, strategic industries before they have the chance to compete. Americans buying broad-market funds deserve transparent rules, reproducible decisions, and meaningful accountability from the committees deciding what they own. Read the full findings and our recommendations below ↓ btcpolicy.org/articles/wall-…

NEW FINDINGS: We took a close look at MSCI’s effort to exclude Bitcoin treasury companies from major stock indexes. We found an internal project trail buried in a public document, years of ESG advocacy, and proposed rules that could reach far beyond Bitcoin. Our new paper, “Wall Street’s Invisible Committee,” documents what we uncovered and provides recommendations for policymakers. MSCI reports an astonishing $21 trillion benchmarked to its indexes. When its committees change which companies qualify, funds tracking those indexes must adjust their holdings. A methodology decision can trigger billions in reallocation. Here’s what we found. 𝟭. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗻𝗲𝘄 𝗽𝗿𝗼𝗽𝗼𝘀𝗮𝗹 𝘀𝘁𝗶𝗹𝗹 𝗰𝗮𝗿𝗿𝗶𝗲𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗼𝗿𝗶𝗴𝗶𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝗽𝗿𝗼𝗷𝗲𝗰𝘁’𝘀 𝗶𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝗻𝗮𝗺𝗲. In 2025, MSCI proposed excluding Digital Asset Treasury Companies (DATCOs) holding at least half their assets in digital assets. After substantial opposition, it shelved the proposal. It later returned this year with a broader, facially neutral test for “non-operating companies.” MSCI’s own simulation would exclude Strategy and Metaplanet. We examined the public consultation PDF and found something revealing in its embedded metadata. The source presentation’s internal file path includes— “Projects/DATCOs/Operating vs Non Operating” A proposal presented as a general classification rule retains a source-file path explicitly associated with the category targeted by the earlier exclusion effort. While metadata alone cannot prove the outcome was predetermined, it raises a direct question for MSCI. Were these criteria developed to classify companies consistently, or engineered to reach the same exclusions against digital asset companies through a broader rule? 𝟮. 𝗠𝗦𝗖𝗜 𝘄𝗮𝘀 𝘀𝗼𝘂𝗻𝗱𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗮𝗹𝗮𝗿𝗺 𝗮𝗯𝗼𝘂𝘁 “𝗰𝗿𝗲𝗲𝗽𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗰𝗿𝘆𝗽𝘁𝗼” 𝘆𝗲𝗮𝗿𝘀 𝗲𝗮𝗿𝗹𝗶𝗲𝗿. We traced its public record back to an October 2021 article titled “Creeping Crypto.” MSCI publicly warned about cryptocurrency exposure entering equity portfolios, described most cryptocurrencies as “speculative investments with little evident utility,” and flagged Bitcoin’s Proof of Work as environmentally dangerous. They identified 26 exposed public companies and promoted tools for screening additional exposure. Singled out at the very bottom of their ESG rankings... was Strategy. While the article did not call for exclusions, it does establish that an internal belief at MSCI that Bitcoin and digital asset companies were an ESG concern four years before proposing to remove digital asset treasury companies. 𝟯. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗰𝗹𝗶𝗺𝗮𝘁𝗲 𝗮𝗴𝗲𝗻𝗱𝗮 𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗰𝗵𝗲𝗱 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗽𝗲𝗼𝗽𝗹𝗲 𝗿𝘂𝗻𝗻𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗯𝘂𝘀𝗶𝗻𝗲𝘀𝘀. CEO Henry Fernandez has repeatedly, publicly proclaimed the urgent importance of ESG investing. In 2021, he recounted urging bankers to “refuse to take a company public or do a bond offering” without a net-zero pledge. MSCI’s leadership also combined responsibility for ESG and index governance. Its then-head of indexes described an ambition for its flagship global index to become “green, one company at a time.” These statements do not prove the motive behind today’s proposal. They make the boundary between MSCI’s advocacy and its broad-market index decisions a serious governance question. 𝟰. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗱𝗶𝘀𝗰𝗿𝗲𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗰𝗼𝘂𝗹𝗱 𝗮𝗳𝗳𝗲𝗰𝘁 𝗔𝗺𝗲𝗿𝗶𝗰𝗮’𝘀 𝗻𝗲𝘅𝘁 𝗴𝗲𝗻𝗲𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗼𝗳 𝗶𝗻𝗱𝘂𝘀𝘁𝗿𝘆. The proposed test relies on “operating assets” without a sufficiently clear, reproducible classification framework. How should it treat a satellite awaiting launch? A mine under construction? Capital raised to build a factory? Our analysis shows how plausible interpretations could disadvantage emerging, strategic industries before they have the chance to compete. Americans buying broad-market funds deserve transparent rules, reproducible decisions, and meaningful accountability from the committees deciding what they own. Read the full findings and our recommendations below ↓ btcpolicy.org/articles/wall-…