The funds from the $3.8M NEAR Intents hack were sent back in full. We are stopping the investigation. Please use bug bounties instead of disrupting the services.

Blast will be shutting down. We launched Blast with the goal of building a self-sustaining chain for users and developers. Unfortunately, the economics of operating the chain no longer make sense: the ongoing costs of maintaining Blast exceed the revenue generated by the L2, and we do not see a credible path to making the chain economically sustainable. As a result, we've made the difficult decision to wind Blast down. We're sorry to the users and developers who believed in Blast, built on it, and supported the ecosystem. Our priority now is making the shutdown as smooth and safe as possible. We're asking all users to withdraw their assets from Blast to Ethereum mainnet, including any balances held in the Blast PWA. To make this easier, we will be reducing the withdrawal delay to 24 hours. As part of the shutdown process, we'll first begin withdrawing Blast's Lido assets. This process is expected to take approximately one week. During this period, withdrawals will temporarily be unavailable, even after the withdrawal delay is reduced to 24 hours. Once that process is complete, withdrawals will resume with the new 24-hour delay. Users will have until October 26, 2026 to withdraw through the normal Blast interface. After October 26, assets will remain withdrawable, but users will need to interact directly with the Blast bridge contracts on Ethereum L1. We'll publish detailed instructions before then. We strongly encourage everyone to withdraw their assets to Ethereum mainnet before October 26.

🚨 NOW: NEAR Intents says it has identified the hacker behind its $3.8M exploit and is giving them 48 hours to return the funds. ct.com/news/near-intents-say…

For the last 6 years we have fixed issues as a DeFi service provider. It is now time for something entirely new. Something where users are actually protected. Downside/risk has to be capped. ETA: 2 weeks Time to fix further issues. A new primitive is coming, made by UNCX 😎

Considering the body of work @SolidProof_io has completed on behalf of the #LUNC $LUNC ecosystem over the last few years, it should have been sufficient to earn trust. The @Allnodes position is untenable & unrealistic. What happens if they don't like the results? They don't pay?

Security Update: We are responding to a security incident affecting part of our infrastructure. At this time, we have identified no immediate threat to MetaMask wallets. As a precaution, we are proactively exiting affected validators within our non-custodial staking operations, in coordination with clients, partners and security advisors. We’ll share further updates as appropriate. metamask.io/news/user-update…

As one of the owners of @SolidProof_io, I can give you a 100 percent guarantee that under NO circumstances will we begin any work without receiving payment upfront. We can proudly say that we’ve built our reputation over half a decade and, as a solid German company, pose no risks all over. I don’t think almost anyone else in the crypto space can say the same. No rebranding, no change in ownership, still the same core team, entirely self-funded, and all backed by a German seal of approval - solidproof.io !!

The $SI dev was a scammer He sniped 32% with side wallets but dumped it for pennies It'd now be worth $15M. Karma 🧵

Great to have @SolidProof_io on board. We’re taking security seriously and having independent eyes review the Aeva stack is an important part of that. Audit work on @AevaChain is officially underway.

We voted YES ✅ | Prop 536 @LuncKickback validator voted YES on the @SolidProof_io security audit + @orbit__labs fixes. Why YES? Last audit was in 2020 pre-crash. Since then SDK v53, CosmWasm changes, custom modules — all unaudited. Exchanges warned listings are at risk without it. This is how we secure $LUNC / $USTC future. Www.luncback.com #TerraClassic #LUNCL

𝗧𝗵𝗶𝘀 𝗶𝘀 𝗮𝗯𝘀𝗼𝗹𝘂𝘁𝗲𝗹𝘆 𝗿𝗶𝗱𝗶𝗰𝘂𝗹𝗼𝘂𝘀. We're now seeing major #LUNC validators voting NO WITH VETO on Proposal #12228 because SolidProof requires payment upfront. Let's put this into the real world. You don't walk into a shop, take the goods and say: "I'll pay you once I've used them and decided I'm satisfied." You don't hire an independent professional business and then demand they adopt your own internal payment system before you'll use their services. PPJ makes sense for developers and teams working within the Terra Classic ecosystem. It protects the Community Pool and provides accountability for work commissioned from ecosystem contributors. But SolidProof is an independent German security company providing a specialist commercial service. They aren't a Terra Classic development team asking for ongoing community funding. Their terms require payment upfront. 𝗪𝗲 𝗲𝗶𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗿 𝗮𝗰𝗰𝗲𝗽𝘁 𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗶𝗿 𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗺𝗲𝗿𝗰𝗶𝗮𝗹 𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗺𝘀 - 𝗼𝗿 𝘄𝗲 𝗱𝗼𝗻'𝘁 𝗵𝗶𝗿𝗲 𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗺. The proposal isn't secretly bypassing PPJ either. It explicitly tells governance that an exception is required for the external auditor, while OrbitLabs' $20,000 implementation work remains standard PPJ and is paid after completion. That's exactly where the distinction should be. External commercial service = their agreed payment terms. Internal LUNC development work = PPJ accountability. Expecting established businesses outside our ecosystem to restructure their commercial payment policies around Terra Classic governance is not realistic. And using NO WITH VETO simply because an external company expects payment according to its normal commercial agreement is, in my view, completely disproportionate. We want serious independent companies to work with #LUNC. We can't simultaneously expect them to operate like Terra Classic community developers. ⚠️ THE USUAL SUSPECTS ABUSING NO WITH VETO YET AGAIN! ...Trying to stifle chain progression! They dont deserve to run Lunc validators with this kind of abuse! #LUNC #TerraClassic $LUNC #USTC #BINANCE #COSMOS @SolidProof_io @orbit__labs

THORChain and Stolen Funds: The Industry Needs Answers After the $1.46B @Bybit_Official hack last year, nearly $1.2B in stolen funds was reportedly traced through @THORChain as the attackers moved assets across chains. Today, following another major security incident at @Bitget , we are once again observing Bitget Exploiter funds being sent into the THORChain for asset swaps and cross-chain transfers. The question is no longer: “Does THORChain know these funds are associated with hackers?” The attacker addresses have already been publicly flagged and are being actively tracked by exchanges, blockchain security/aml firms, and the wider crypto industry. The real question is: When a protocol is aware that funds originate from a publicly identified major hack, yet continues to facilitate large-scale cross-chain swaps, how should the industry view this under the banner of “decentralization”? Decentralization should not become a blanket excuse when dealing with known stolen funds. If, after every major crypto hack, attackers can continue using THORChain as a route to move funds from ETH → BTC, BNB → BTC, and across other chains, the industry needs to seriously ask: What responsibility should THORChain bear when handling known stolen funds? @GracyBitget @xiejiayinBitget @benbybit

We are devasted to hear about the recent exploit and can imagine how difficult this must be for everyone involved. THORChain is decentralized and permissionless like Bitcoin, Ethereum, and BNB Chain. What responsibility should Bitcoin, Ethereum, and BNB Chain bear when handling known stolen funds? @star_okx @GracyBitget